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Abstract
The national priority to advance early detection and intervention for children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has not reduced the late
age of ASD diagnosis in the US over several consecutive Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) surveillance cohorts, with tra-
ditionally under-served populations accessing diagnosis later still. In this review, we explore a potential perceptual barrier to this enterprise
which views ASD in terms that are contradicted by current science, and which may have its origins in the current definition of the condition
and in its historical associations. To address this perceptual barrier, we propose a re-definition of ASD in early brain development terms,
with a view to revisit the world of opportunities afforded by current science to optimize children’s outcomes despite the risks that they are
born with. This view is presented here to counter outdated notions that potentially devastating disability is determined the moment a child
is born, and that these burdens are inevitable, with opportunities for improvement being constrained to only alleviation of symptoms or
limited improvements in adaptive skills. The impetus for this piece is the concern that such views of complex neurodevelopmental condi-
tions, such as ASD, can become self-fulfilling science and policy, in ways that are diametrically opposed to what we currently know, and are
learning every day, of how genetic risk becomes, or not, instantiated as lifetime disabilities.
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Perceptual Barriers to Early Identification and Treatment of
Infants and Toddlers at Risk for ASD
For the past decade, a strong consensus has emerged among the
scientific community singling out early detection and intervention
as critically important factors in societal efforts to optimize out-
comes of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
(Daniels, Halladay, Shih, Elder, & Dawson, 2014; Dawson, 2016;
Dawson et al., 2010; Dawson & Bernier, 2013; Reichow, Hume,
Barton, & Boyd, 2018; Warren et al., 2011; Wetherby et al.,
2014). And yet, the median age of ASD diagnosis in the US
remains stubbornly stuck at the late age of 4–5 years (Baio
et al., 2018; Christensen et al., 2016; Maenner et al., 2020), and
later still in low-income families (Christensen et al., 2016;
Fountain, King, & Bearman, 2011; Mandell et al., 2009).
Although community uptake of universal screening for ASD in
primary care appears to be steadily rising (Adams & Tapia,
2013; Daniels et al., 2014), several challenges continue to limit
the beneficial impact of this practice, including screening tools
with unacceptable levels of false negatives (Guthrie et al., 2019),
indications that approximately half of all screen-positive children
may never access diagnostic services (Daniels et al., 2014; Robins
et al., 2014), and a pervasive belief by some practitioners that no
definitive evidence is available to date proving that universal
screening efforts lead to better outcomes, a belief that may deeply
undermine efforts to implement universal surveillance and
screening practices (Al-Qabandi, Gorter, & Rosenbaum, 2011;
Siu et al., 2016). Collectively, these challenges greatly restrict
access to federally mandated early treatment, 34 years after the
original mandate was created as Part H of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and 23 years after it was
re-authorized by US Congress as Part C of IDEA (Adams &
Tapia, 2013; US Department of Education, 2018).
This entrenched public health failure remains unchanged over
the years despite the high priority assigned to ASD early detection
and treatment by some leading scientific and professional organi-
zations, such as the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee
(IACC) (US Department of Health & Human Services, 2017) and
the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) (Hyman, Levy, &
Myers, 2020; Johnson & Myers, 2007). The IACC coalesces the
expertise and resolve of all federal agencies involved in ASD
research and services, including the National Institutes of
Health, while the AAP has, since 2007, made universal screening
for ASD a key element of their recommended best practices.
These recommendations, however, have not translated into bind-
ing policies, data-monitored practices or societal investments
commensurate with the level of criticality assigned by these lead-
ing organizations to early detection and intervention. Consider,
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for example, that the IDEA Part C—as noted, the portion of the
IDEA focused on infants and toddlers with disabilities—receives
only 3.5% of the entire US$13.45 billion IDEA appropriation,
with 95% of IDEA funds dedicated to education of children
aged 3–21 years (Dragoo, 2019). While one important appropri-
ation purpose should not come at the expense of another, this dis-
tribution highlights the fact that the period of birth-to-three years
is undervalued in societal efforts to address the needs of children
with developmental disabilities. It is no surprise, therefore, that
among children with neurodevelopmental conditions, only 20%
of those who receive special education services during their
school-age years are identified prior to the age of 3 years (US
Department of Education, 2018).
These realities are completely unaligned with research.
Scientific evidence continues to accumulate, indicating that the
earlier a child’s diagnosis can be established, the better the child’s
long-term outcome and the less expensive and intensive services
need to be later in the child’s life (Dawson et al., 2010; Reichow
et al., 2018; Warren et al., 2011; Wetherby et al., 2014). In sum-
mary, our current societal investments reflect a major disconnect
between science and policy, undoing the public health opportunities
afforded by early treatment: we are neither optimizing outcomes
nor being good stewards of limited governmental funds. In fact,
most of the federal resources available to benefit individuals
with ASD and their families go to provide educational, medical
and support services to severely affected adolescents and adults
with ASD (Buescher et al., 2014; US Department of Education,
2018). While this is, of course, a critically important need, this
allocation seems to be self-perpetuating because of a widely
held view that the severely compromised outcomes of some chil-
dren with ASD is an inevitability. At times, it appears that for
some stakeholders, ASD is this profile of severely compromised
outcomes, and this view can, and it maybe has, become a self-
fulfilling policy. It can hamstring the movement that advances
the opposite outlook, namely that future outcomes of children
with ASD, and the political economy of ASD, can be radically
improved via greater community uptake of effective surveillance
and screening methods, and of increased access to diagnostic ser-
vices and to cost-effective early treatments.
For developmental scientists, the essence of the argument is
clear: due to delays in early detection and treatment, the point
at which a child can be accurately identified and treated moves
from within a window of tremendous neuroplasticity (Johnson,
1999)—the first months and years after birth—to a point several
years hence, when many years of development have already inter-
ceded and played a large role in shaping the course of a child’s
condition (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003). This marks
the loss of a potentially critical opportunity for improving treat-
ment efficacy and associated outcomes (Dawson et al., 2012).
From a public health standpoint, the effects of this failure are
equally clear: because of late detection and diagnosis, at least
50% of children are identified only during their school-age
years, often, by then, because of severe disruptive behavior and
aggravated social, communicative, and behavioral symptoms
resulting from years of untreated ASD (Klin & Jones, 2018).
And because age of detection and diagnosis is later still in low-
income, minority, and rural populations, children with ASD in
these sectors of the community may have worse outcomes than
those of their middle-class/Caucasian peers (Daniels & Mandell,
2014) as a direct result of this healthcare disparity. The latest
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ASD preva-
lence data support this hypothesis: by the time children with
ASD are 8 years old, the burden of intellectual disability among
African American children with ASD is 47%, or almost double
the burden of intellectual disability in Caucasian children,
which is 27%; for Hispanic children, the rate of intellectual dis-
ability is 36%, falling between these two extremes (Constantino
et al., in press; Maenner et al., 2020).
Factors hindering population-wide uptake of early detection
and intervention can be traced to a wide range of implementation
challenges, such as lack of cost-effective and accurate screening
tools, challenging time requirements and lack of cost coverage
in primary care settings, limited funding for and integration of
family supports, among others (Daniels & Mandell, 2014;
Guthrie et al., 2019; Honigfeld, Chandhok, & Spiegelman,
2012). Solutions for each of these obstacles will advance imple-
mentation of early detection and intervention, but they will not
counter an obstacle of a different kind—a perceptual barrier, a
prevailing view of ASD, held by many scientists, providers, and
policy makers alike, which undermines any discourse advancing
the potential benefits of early treatment. We raise this hypothe-
sized challenge because we have encountered it consistently in sci-
entific and policy/advocacy forums, among colleagues in research
centers, and in policy-making and execution agencies. It refers to
a view of ASD that sees the condition as a relatively rare brain
“disease” of genetic origins, defined by intellectual disabilities
and severe behavior challenges, and with lifetime outcomes
defined primarily by deterministic gene–brain pathology a child
is born with. This view of ASD has two main implications.
First, it prompts a science intended to find “the cause” of ASD
and to generate a treatment for it, with the ultimate goal of “cur-
ing” individuals of this “disease.” Second, it limits our imagina-
tion, and our resolve, to consider the possibilities afforded by
early treatment given that, according to this view, the potential
for change and improvements are deterministically constrained
by the genetic and brain liabilities a child is born with. We
pose that this is a limiting and untenable view of ASD; that it orig-
inates from the current definition of ASD, and from its historical
roots; and that it is contradicted by new research emerging in
genetics, epidemiology, and developmental social neuroscience.
We pose further that in order to recover the world of possibilities
afforded by this new science, there is a need to ground ASD
research and policy, certainly insofar as infants and toddlers are
concerned, in a developmental psychopathology framework
(Beauchaine, Constantino, & Hayden, 2018). In essence, we
need to afford ASD of an early brain development re-definition.
To present an early brain development rethinking of ASD in
juxtaposition to a view of ASD as a “rare genetic disease” might
appear to some as a “strawman argument”: most investigators
in the field would not subscribe to the notion that ASD is either
“rare” or “immutable.” Our intention in using this juxtaposition is
to lay bare the possibility that even though few would subscribe to
this notion, many construct their hypotheses, design their experi-
ments, and interpret their findings in ways that perpetuate it, thus
leading to waves of science and policy debates consistent with the
logical implications of this outdated view. In many ways, this situa-
tion is consistent with what Oyama (2000) masterfully described as
the nature/nurture false dichotomy, as most investigators do not
openly espouse a radical nature-only or nurture-only approach
and yet appear to create theories and build experiments to test
them as if they did. Most importantly, such tendentious lines of
research are likely to perpetuate the false dichotomy and to fail to
advance more sophisticated syntheses capable of moving the field
of child development forward (Oyama, 2000).
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The Current Definition of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)
and its Misconceptions
The definition of ASD remains essentially unchanged since
Kanner’s observations of 11 children who displayed a constella-
tion of behavioral symptoms in the areas of social and communi-
cative function, behavioral rigidities and sensory sensitivities
(Kanner, 1943). Rutter codified these symptoms (Rutter, 1978)
in what became eventually the formal nosology of autism
(Volkmar, Bregman, Cohen, & Cicchetti, 1988), enduring, with
minor changes, to this day (American Psychiatric Association,
2013; Lord & Jones, 2012). There have been, nevertheless, dra-
matic advances in the operationalization of the definition (Lord
et al., 2012), both in terms of standard tools for diagnosis (Kim
& Lord, 2012) and a broadening of phenotypic expressions to
encompass individuals with lesser levels of syndrome expression
and disability (Lord & Jones, 2012). In fact, it became one of
the most well-researched and validated nosologic entities among
all psychiatric conditions, and it has made possible the emergence
of a massive scientific literature, more accurate prevalence rates,
and the critically important attainment of life-changing medical,
educational, and support services for individuals with ASD
(Silverman, 2012; Volkmar & McPartland, 2014).
For all of the remarkable achievements of the categorical def-
inition of ASD, its enduring continuity over decades also resulted
in the accumulation of cultural and scientific perceptions that no
longer apply. These perceptions come from some preservation of
obsolete knowledge and from some failure to assimilate the
implications of new knowledge. Consider that what we know
now is vastly different from what we knew at the time the term
“autism” was coalescing into a set of observational criteria,
around the late 1960s and 1970s: prevalence was thought to be
4:10,000 (Wing, O’Connor, & Lotter, 1967)—not the current
185:10,000 (Maenner et al., 2020); the rate of intellectual disabil-
ities was thought to be up to 80% (Rutter, Greenfeld, & Lockyer,
1967) —not the current epidemiological rate of 33% (Maenner
et al., 2020); its genetic basis was suspected but was otherwise a
mystery (Rutter, 1968) —now we know of over a hundred genes
implicated (Satterstrom et al., 2020) and a recurrence rate in
sibships of 16–36% (McDonald et al., 2019), with another consider-
able percentage displaying subthreshold forms of the condition
(Ozonoff et al., 2011); and while both Kanner and Rutter surmised
that autism was present from birth, there was no, or very little,
direct observations of the first three years of life (Klin et al.,
2004); now knowledge of prodromal expressions is accruing at a
very fast rate (Szatmari et al., 2016), and brain–behavior develop-
mental trajectories of infants later diagnosed with autism are
being charted almost from birth (Hazlett et al., 2017; Jones &
Klin, 2013).
These straightforward historical contrasts should influence our
views of what ASD is and is not. ASD is amongst the most com-
mon complex neurodevelopmental conditions; it is not a syn-
drome of intellectual disabilities. Its genetic basis is extremely
complex, with literally hundreds of etiologies. Heritability is very
high but it shades into a spectrum of clinically subthreshold expres-
sions, including expressions that could be described as normally dis-
tributed human traits rather than symptoms (Constantino, Zhang,
Frazier, Abbacchi, & Law, 2010); and the emergence of symptoms
by the second and third year of life, the very symptoms that define
the condition, is the culmination of a developmental process that
begins from birth or shortly thereafter, not its onset (Johnson
et al., 2005; Shultz, Klin, & Jones, 2018).
Consider the implications of not assimilating these facts into
our views of ASD
If the psychiatric category of ASD delineates a well-defined and
discrete pathological condition, set as a binary nosology of ASD
versus non-ASD (like having or not having an infection), and if
ASD is viewed as a rare and an almost invariably devastating
cause of impairments to a child’s intellectual and adaptive skills
(like a monogenic and highly penetrant genetic syndrome such
as Rett syndrome; Lyst & Bird, 2015), then it should be no
surprise that such a condition would be treated as other serious
low-prevalence medical diseases of genetic origins (like a leuko-
dystrophy). That its science should strive to find discrete causes
and discrete treatments (like an antibiotic for a given infection)
and that, until causes were discovered and specific treatments
were developed, treatments available would be considered limited
to symptomatic improvements or to alleviation of suffering. The
corollary of this view is also quite straightforward: why should
one invest in the early detection of a disease if one cannot cure
it or ameliorate it in any substantial way? In fact, investment in
early detection and diagnosis might be considered even unethical:
why should we screen for a condition for which we have nothing,
or nothing curative, to offer?
Now consider the implications of allowing these facts to
re-shape our views of ASD
If the category of ASD is porous and shades into traits rather than
pathologies (as in the construct of the “broader autism pheno-
type” (Sucksmith, Roth, & Hoekstra, 2011); if ASD is common
and levels of ability and disability contain the full spectrum of
intellectual variation; if genetic risks and heritability patterns
are not deterministic of outcome (they are complex and multifac-
torial, evident in the case of siblings, who may share genetic risks
but may be, or not, “affected”); and if deviations from normative
development precede the onset of symptoms (like high blood
pressure may precede a stroke); it should be no surprise that
such a condition would be treated as a common medical risk of
genetic origins—a public health risk rather than a rare disease.
This would be akin to the difference between say prematurity
and leukodystrophies. Conceptually, it would open up the possi-
bility that whether or not risk converts into a lifetime of disabil-
ities might be a function of interactions between Risk × Early-life
events, including not only naturally occurring Gene ×
Environment interactions but also deliberate, early therapeutic
manipulations, which, of course, would only be made possible
via early surveillance, detection, and intervention. In this view,
science should strive to understand the interplay between genetic
risks and disruptions of normative processes preceding the emer-
gence of symptoms, and treatments should be developed to opti-
mize outcomes, by either normalizing experience or by
introducing compensatory learning (Zwaigenbaum et al., 2015).
The corollaries of this view are straightforward: there is no need
to wait for discoveries of what causes ASD or for “cures” to
treat the condition because early treatment might promote best
outcomes given a child’s inborn risks; these best outcomes are
unlikely to mean the erasure of a genetic trait or constellation
of traits (like “autism,” or social ability/disability), but the preven-
tion, or amelioration, of associated burdens such as intellectual,
language communication or behavioral disabilities (Micheletti
et al., 2020). In this light, the lack of investment in early detection
and diagnosis is profoundly unethical since whether or not inborn
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risks convert into a lifetime of disability is dependent on what
happens to the child’s early life, and this, in turn, can be inter-
vened with via early treatment. More starkly, one might consider
the public health challenge and the public health opportunity
associated with ASD: approximately 71,800 children who are
born every year in the US will develop ASD; their lifetime out-
comes may depend, to a meaningful degree, on whether or not
these children and their families can access early treatment.
This general scientific approach to adverse outcomes resulting
from inborn or early-life risks is hardly novel in developmental
psychopathology (Cicchetti & Toth, 2009), and it has become
deeply ingrained in best-practice parameters, policy, and pro-
grams in regards to some conditions such as congenital hearing
impairment (Korver et al., 2017); congenital heart disease neces-
sitating first-year-of-life surgery(ies) (Marino et al., 2012;
Mussatto et al., 2017); extreme prematurity (Greene & Patra,
2016; McManus, Carle, & Poehlmann, 2012); adverse social and
family-related conditions collectively captured by the term “social
determinants of health” (Alley, Asomugha, Conway, & Sanghavi,
2016; McGinnis, Williams-Russo, & Knickman, 2002); among
many other conditions. The connection works in the other direc-
tion as well. Risks for adverse conditions identified in adolescence
often originate in early life, with a stark example being juvenile
delinquency: to single a critical one—language vulnerability—
close to half of adolescents involved in the juvenile justice system
present with language disorders (Hughes et al., 2017; Moncrieff,
miller, & HIll, 2018); given the stability of core language skills
from infancy to adolescence in typical and atypical development
(Bornstein, Hahn, Putnick, & Pearson, 2018), there is consensus
on promoting language resiliency in at-risk infants and toddlers
growing up in adverse environmental conditions (Johnson, Riis,
& Noble, 2016).
In ASD, by contrasting these two views —autism as a genetic
disease relative to autism as a genetic risk—different sets of
priorities for future research and policy emerge
The view of ASD as a genetic disease places it in the company of
rare genetic syndromes that may overlap somewhat with ASD in
clinical presentation, such as Rett’s syndrome, tuberous sclerosis
complex, and Angelman’s syndrome, among others (Richards,
Jones, Groves, Moss, & Oliver, 2015), and whose potential for
optimized outcomes is more limited given the penetrance of the
genetic cause and the severity of its effects. These conditions, in
turn, are sometimes deemed so severe that they are discussed
alongside potentially lethal genetic diseases, such as spinal mus-
cular atrophy (Kraszewski et al., 2018), in which the scientific
imperative is to identify mechanistic processes via which specific
mutations lead to disease (i.e., studies to elucidate the causative
processes tying molecular abnormalities to abnormal cell and
brain circuit pathophysiologies), and then implement a form of
gene therapy that can reverse the condition (Dunbar et al., 2018).
The view of ASD as a genetic risk takes us in a very different
direction. It begins with a shift in scientific emphasis from causes
of neurodevelopmental liabilities to prevention, or at least attenu-
ation, of the deleterious effects of those risks upon early brain
development (Klin & Jones, 2018). This is a radical move, and
one that takes us away from the prevailing model in investigative
medicine, one of the reasons why, we believe, it has had little trac-
tion so far. Making the differences explicit might be helpful. This
is a move away from the model that has led to some of the greatest
achievements in medicine, in which the most momentous health
benefits originated from discoveries of causes of disease. Maybe
the greatest medical achievement of all, the discovery of germs,
led to antiseptic practices in surgical procedures, the discovery
of antibiotics, and the development of vaccines, thus preventing
or treating lethal infections and providing active acquired immu-
nity to a host of devastating diseases among millions of people
(Butler, 2014; Lewis, 2013; Zaffiri, Gardner, & Toledo-Pereyra,
2012). This influential model, however, has not been fruitful in
the management of complex neurodevelopmental conditions.
On the one hand, there are several neurodevelopmental con-
ditions for which the causes have been known for several
decades and yet our ability to minimize their impact on brain
development is still limited. Examples are Fragile X (Warren,
Zhang, Licameli, & Peters, 1987) and Rett (Zoghbi et al., 1999)
syndromes. On the other hand, for the vast majority of
“non-syndromic” affected individuals, the causes of common
neurodevelopmental conditions such as ASD (Geschwind,
2011), language and communication delays (Sriganesh &
Ponniah, 2018), and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) (Thapar, 2018) are extremely complex in their genetic
bases and vastly heterogeneous in their symptomatic presentation,
thus tempering hopes for momentous etiologic discoveries in the
near future that could tractably pinpoint specific, mechanistic and
curative treatments to these conditions, as they likely result from
multifactorial, early disruptions at the level of molecular, cell and
brain circuitry, beginning prenatally, and progressing via cycles of
iterative interactions with environment. Most importantly, there is
also substantial genetic overlaps between these conditions (e.g.,
ASD and ADHD), and genetic correlations with a much broader
group of neuropsychiatric disorders (Thapar, 2018) and nonpsy-
chiatric conditions (e.g., congenital heart disease) (Homsy et al.,
2015).
To shift our scientific focus from “curing a disease” to “opti-
mizing outcomes” does not mean to abandon research on the eti-
ologic bases of complex neurodevelopmental disorders. Rather it
calls for near-term action that can promote early brain develop-
ment despite the burdens with which, or within which, a child
is born. This shift may also reflect an emerging realization that
common neurodevelopmental conditions, such as ASD and
ADHD, are extreme ends of continuously distributed dimensions,
akin to hypertension along the continuum of blood pressure
(Constantino, 2011; Thapar, 2018). In other words: while usefully
conceptualized as disorders in clinical practice, ASD and ADHD
can be viewed as constellation of traits capable of adversely
impacting development, which is a conceptualization of psychiat-
ric disorders that may also promote greater inclusion of, and less
stigma to, individuals affected. In ASD, intellectually intact self-
advocates take issue with the definition of their condition as a
“disease” in need of curative treatment or prevention, as success
in these efforts (say, via gene therapy) would result in the “erad-
ication” of individuals like them; clearly, a more apt and inclusive
approach, would be to refer to individuals with ASD as “uniquely
human” (Prizant, 2015), with maybe uncommon profiles of trait
variation but capable of both attaining unique achievements and
of being agents of society’s full load of rights and responsibilities.
If the goal of interventions is to optimize outcomes, then the pur-
pose of treatment and supports would not be to “cure a person of
a human trait or constellation of traits,” but to ensure that inborn
risks or vulnerabilities do not translate into disabilities, specifi-
cally, severe intellectual, language and behavioral disabilities.
To shift the focus from an attempt to “cure” ASD to a focus on
optimizing the outcomes of children at risk for ASD also expands
4 A. Klin et al.
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the realm of inquiry, from specific genetic risks to a more compre-
hensive view of factors that may promote or compromise a child’s
outcome, thus going beyond genetic susceptibility to include a
wide range of factors such as adverse medical or environmental
conditions, or even random environmental variation (White,
2019). A helpful analogy might be drawn from the field of global
health: consider the possibility of not waiting for discoveries of
the causes of poverty to begin acting upon the active ingredients
that translate poverty into compromised childhood health. For
example, while we discuss the roots of poverty, we should not dis-
card the tremendous benefits of immediate action focused on
finding say clear sources of drinking water, supplying mosquito
nets, and changing policy promoting more favorable social deter-
minants of health. These health-promoting factors are not meant
to combat poverty per se, an economics construct; they are
intended to promote resiliency, in the presence of the identified
risk (being poor), so that a given child is less likely to succumb
to a disease or to another adverse outcome that poverty may
lead to. More specifically, this approach is meant to identify the
immediate, proximal active ingredients (say lack of clean water)
of a potentially deleterious influence (poverty). If we apply this
analogy to ASD, then the question remains as to what are the
potential active ingredients promoting or disrupting early brain
development, and whether we can engineer viable solutions—
treatments, interventions—that will make vulnerable children—
born with genetic risks for ASD–less likely to succumb to their
risks—to have ASD with severe intellectual, language, and behav-
ioral disabilities.
It is an interesting question in the history and sociology of
medicine as to why ASD has become imbued with this level of
genetic determinism while other childhood conditions, such as
ADHD, are more readily situated at the intersection of genetics
and environment (Faraone et al., 2015). While this may be due
to its strong genetics, its early onset, or the public face of ASD
as its most severe expressions, this perception may have also
been inherent in the history of autism research going back to
soon after Kanner’s original description (1943). During the
1950s and 1960s, autism was often described in the medical liter-
ature as a “psychogenic” disorder, due to “bad parenting”: the
so-called “refrigerator mother” hypothesis. This perception, with
no evidence, permeated public discourse and psychological
research, and shaped treatment parameters and even educational
policies which, collectively, victimized parents of children with
ASD, misled contemporaneous research and clinical practice,
and, in some quarters of the world, continued to do so into the
new millennium (Grinker, 2007; Silverman, 2012). It is hardly
surprising that the first dents into this theory came from
parent-scientists of children with autism (Rimland, 1964; Wing,
1964), whose science, including epidemiology, were clearly
incompatible with the psychogenic hypothesis. With the advent
of the very first twin study of autism (Folstein & Rutter, 1977),
the genetic basis of the condition was firmly established, situating
autism research strongly in the realm of biological medicine while
jump-starting several decades of ever-accelerating advances in
genetics research of ASD. One possibility, therefore, for current
views of ASD in genetic-deterministic terms might be the residual
trauma in the field resulting from the psychogenic hypothesis, a
hypothesis that is fully undermined by inborn genetic causes.
Understandable as it might be given this historical context, the
perception of ASD in genetic-deterministic terms can itself lead to
deleterious effects on research and policy, including efforts to
reduce age of diagnosis and increase access to early treatment
and intervention. This reckoning is, in our view, overdue. To
rephrase the all-important question: what can we do to ensure
that a genetic risk (or risks), such as autism, does not convert
into a lifetime of disabilities? Two recent debates should bench-
mark what is at stake if we ignore this issue, thus failing to invest
in research and policy aimed at optimizing the outcomes of vul-
nerable children.
First, following up on reports that by the age of 24 to 36
months the clinical outcomes of toddlers in research studies
depends on a given study’s ascertainment strategy (i.e., sampling
method; Bornstein, Jager, & Putnick, 2013), a recent meta-
analysis compared toddlers’ outcomes across studies recruiting
subjects prospectively, via community or clinical referral, and
via universal screening (Micheletti et al., 2020). The rationale
for these comparisons was that if community or clinical referral
systematically biases recruitment toward a more severely affected
sample, then recruitment using universal screening, without such
referral bias, would result in a less severely affected sample, like in
the case of prospective recruitment. Results showed that outcomes
in community referral and universal screening were comparable,
whereas outcomes of children followed prospectively were signifi-
cantly better. The authors suggested the possibility of a “surveil-
lance effect,” or the notion that monitoring and supporting a
family prospectively may be by itself a beneficial intervention
that, if deployed early enough, might be sufficient to “move the
needle” of improved outcomes in young children with ASD.
This hypothesis raises the possibility that something as genetically
based and potentially grave as ASD could in fact be altered by an
effort to train and support caregivers and promote a family’s resil-
iency. If corroborated, surveillance and parent training could
become a community-viable intervention. In fact, this possibility
would build strongly from evidence-based ASD early treatments,
most of which emphasize caregiver-mediated treatments
(Schreibman et al., 2015).
And second, the belief of ASD as a deterministic, genetically
based disease or disorder, has also resulted in a state of literature
that almost virtually ignores the possibility that socio-
demographic variables, and early childhood and family hardships
associated with these variables, could play a role in determining
the outcomes of children vulnerable to ASD (Bornstein et al.,
2013; Micheletti et al., 2020). One rarely hears of debates on
healthcare disparities, adverse childhood experiences, or social
determinants of health in the cases of children with very rare
genetic diseases, such as leukodystrophies and highly penetrant
genetic syndromes of intellectual disabilities. If ASD is one of
such rare and devastating conditions, there should be no need,
for example, for National Institutes of Health (NIH) or peer-
review journals to demand that experimental variables (in clinical
science and trials) are analyzed by variables such as socioeco-
nomic status (SES) or race/ethnicity. Of course, such a character-
ization of ASD is false. ASD research and service are plagued by
healthcare disparities, particularly in regards to early outcomes
(Daniels & Mandell, 2014), with unacceptable liabilities experi-
enced by some sectors of the community (e.g., as noted,
African American children with ASD having almost double the
rate of intellectual disability than their Caucasian peers by 8
years of age) (Maenner et al., 2020). And yet, with the exception
of some noteworthy journals, it is rare for developmental science
studies to include sociodemographic variables (Bornstein et al.,
2013). As a result, the question as to whether ASD vulnerability
may aggravate and be aggravated by adverse experiences associ-
ated with specific socio-demographic variables such as “low-
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income,” “minority,” or “rural,” and related hardships such as
adverse childhood experiences, is virtually untouched in ASD
research. And yet, this is precisely the pillar upon which most
research in common early childhood conditions is built, concep-
tually, clinically, methodologically, and epidemiologically
(Shonkoff, 2011, 2017). In a way, to consider ASD within the con-
text of what promotes, or not, early brain development is to tear it
away from the “rare disease” class of childhood conditions and
place it squarely into the category of “common public health
risk.” To draw this analogy more starkly: it is not inevitable that
a maltreated infant will end up becoming a juvenile delinquent
(Cicchetti, 2013). Similarly, it is not inevitable that an infant
born with autism as a risk will end up with severe intellectual, lan-
guage, and behavioral disabilities (Klin & Jones, 2018).
To define ASD as a genetic risk impacting early brain develop-
ment makes it akin to a host of other common conditions of early
childhood, such as language and communication delays, disorders
of attention, learning and self-regulation, among others, all of
which have a (complex) genetic component but which are also
influenced by a host of environmental factors, collectively pushing
and pulling on active ingredients influencing a child’s eventual
outcome. To identify these “active ingredients” there is a need
to ground ASD in the early-onset normative processes of social
and communicative development, and then to interrogate these
processes in search of opportunities for promoting resiliency,
course corrections, and compensations, all of which integral ele-
ments of the developmental psychopathology movement (Cicchetti
& Cohen, 1995). In what follows, we briefly survey the opportunities
emerging from such an attempt to re-define ASD in terms of early
brain development principles and processes.
Re-defining ASD in Early Brain Development Terms
A discussion of ASD pathogenesis in the context of early brain
development has commonly built on the following themes
On neuroplasticity
The first two years of human life represent the period of greatest
brain transformation: a newborn’s brain doubles in size in the first
year of life, and will increase again by another 35% by year three
(Gilmore et al., 2007; Pfefferbaum et al., 1994); synaptic density
quadruples within year one alone, and will reach levels 200–
300% greater than that of an adult by the end of the third year
(with concurrent and subsequent pruning and strengthening)
(Huttenlocher, 1979; Petanjek et al., 2011). Of importance, longi-
tudinal gene expression associated with synaptogenesis over the
first two years of life, over a wide range of brain structures, is char-
acterized by lifetime maximal values across the 6- to 12-month
window, then decreases drastically after 15 months, or much before
the time at which autism symptoms emerge and the condition can
be reliably diagnosed (Kang et al., 2011; Shultz et al., 2018).
In this light, a healthcare system designed to deliver treatment
only after an ASD diagnosis is secured, even if the diagnosis is
obtained relatively early between ages 2 and 3 years, would
already have missed the best window of opportunity signified
by this early period of maximal neuroplasticity. It follows that
there will be a need for early intervention to be deployed on the
basis of prodromal risks, unlikely to be symptoms themselves
(aberrant behavior), and more likely to be deviations from norma-
tive developmental processes (Klin, Shultz, & Jones, 2015).
A critical aspect of this hyper-neuroplastic period is that brain
development is not only being guided by an inborn genetic
timetable for maturation, but it is also becoming the physical
instantiation of the child’s lived experiences, which in turn, mod-
erate epigenetic processes (Shultz et al., 2018; Szyf & Bick, 2013).
This principle of early brain development was stated best in
Joseph Ledoux’s subtitle for his “Synaptic Self” book: “How our
brains become who we are” (LeDoux, 2003). This principle has
two critical implications.
First, a child’s early experiences matter a great deal, contribut-
ing to the canalization of subsequent learning, typical or atypical,
as experiences result from adaptation and learning and then
become the affordance for new learning and experiences, and
again and again, in a brain–behavior tight system of interdepen-
dence and co-opting movement forward (Fox, Levitt, & Nelson,
2010). Second, this experience and learning is happening in the
context of the surrounding environment, via brain-mediated,
bi-directional and iterative relationships between a child and
their social and physical environments, which need to be rigor-
ously quantified, spatially (in terms of proximity to a child’s inter-
nal state, actions, and reactions), and temporally (in terms of time
varying periods of a child’s development) (Berman, Stier, &
Akcelik, 2019). We know that brain capitalizes on chance events,
or stochastic processes, prenatally and postnatally (Jensen, 1997;
Molenaar, Boomsma, & Dolan, 1993), and there is evidence
that fostering positive environmental factors building on these
stochastic processes can optimize neurodevelopment providing a
child with greater resilience (White, 2019).
On social development and disruptions thereof
The most robust markers for early diagnosis of ASD in the first 3
years of life include reduced interaction with and attention to oth-
ers; reduced attention to others’ eyes; failure to respond to the
calling of one’s own name; and inability to join in imitative
games and reciprocal vocalizations (Klin et al., 2015; Wetherby
et al., 2004; Zwaigenbaum et al., 2009)—all failures in normative
skills that represent milestones in typical development. These
deviations in social interaction and social communication then
become causative factors in subsequent atypical developmental,
following a trajectory that culminates with the emergence of autis-
tic symptomatology (Klin et al., 2003). Given the centrality and
robustness of these early indicators, a great deal of work on the
early pathogenesis of ASD has focused on the social and social
communication domains of development, with important
advancements in quantitative, performance-based assays. This
emphasis does not ignore or invalidate research focused on
other early signs of ASD, including “domain general” motor, sen-
sory or other early impairments: these may act in concert to gen-
erate the defining social–communicative disability in ASD, either
via independent and additive genetic liabilities (Pohl et al., 2019)
or via developmental inter-dependencies, as most social–commu-
nicative competencies require the coordination of skills across
various areas of sensory, motor, and cognitive skills (Shultz
et al., 2018).
In the social domain, two decades of work have led to the
hypothesis that developmental disruptions of evolutionarily
highly conserved and developmentally early-emerging mecha-
nisms of socialization drive pathogenesis and result in autism
symptoms (Johnson et al., 2005; Klin et al., 2015). These include
a wide range of social visual engagement behaviors, such as pref-
erential attention to biological motion (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo,
Ramsay, & Jones, 2009), which is not only a “life or con-specific
detector” but is also a foundational underpinning of social cogni-
tion (Johnson, 2006); eye-looking and gaze behavior (Jones &
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Klin, 2013), which are critical for extraction of social adaptive
information (Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith, 2001), and are potent
enhancers of neural processing of social information throughout
the lifespan (Adolphs et al., 2005; Farroni, Johnson, & Csibra,
2004); monitoring of social activity (Chawarska, Macari, &
Shic, 2013; Shic, Bradshaw, Klin, Scassellati, & Chawarska,
2011), which is critical for detecting the relative salience of spe-
cific environmental components and then behaviorally adjust-
ing to them; among others. All of these disruptions in
normative skills occur much prior to the advent of ASD symp-
toms, and some can predict not only diagnostic classification
but also level of autistic disability some several years later,
when the diagnosis of ASD is already strongly stable (Jones
& Klin, 2013).
On the accrual of moment-by-moment deviations from
normative social development
The mechanisms of socialization surveyed above represent tools
for moment-by-moment learning that a baby deploys to adapt
to the surrounding environment, both physical and social. To
fully appreciate the impact on development that disruptions in
these mechanisms may have, it is important to restate and empha-
size that these are tools for learning and adaptation. Consider
social visual engagement, which is the way in which infants visu-
ally explore, engage, and ultimately learn from and adapt to their
surrounding world. In this domain, genetic control is exercised
over macroscales—for example, patterns of visual fixation over
minutes of social visual experiences; and over microscales—for
example, moment-by-moment predispositions to react to and
seek social information in the surrounding social world, such as
when to shift one’s visual attention, in which direction, and
onto which targets, measured in milliseconds (Constantino
et al., 2017). In essence, via these predispositions, infants and tod-
dlers create their own individual niches (Oyama, 2000; Super &
Harkness, 1986), which both constrain the environmental realm
within which they will learn, and intensify inter-actions with
these preferred aspects of the world (Klin et al., 2003; Shultz
et al., 2018). These same assays of social visual engagement,
which demonstrate, for example, a broad sense heritability equal
to about 0.90 (for summary levels of eye-looking), are pathogno-
monically impaired in infants later diagnosed with ASD, with dif-
ferences observed from at least 2 months onwards (Jones & Klin,
2013), and reliably segregate toddlers with ASD from other tod-
dlers (Constantino et al., 2017). Importantly, toddlers with ASD
diverge from their peers in their moment-by-moment social
attention: when viewing complex videos of social situations,
typically developing toddlers will collectively focus on “hot
spots of socialization,” or locations on-screen at specific
moments in time, which carry most of the information they
need to process in order to understand and successfully adapt
to the social scene. In measuring these moment-by-moment
patterns of social visual engagement (Constantino et al.,
2017), toddlers with ASD diverge from their peers hundreds
of times over a period of no more than 5–6 min of video watch-
ing. These divergences represent missed opportunities for social
learning. If transposed into their real-life social experiences,
these results would indicate that toddlers with ASD may miss
thousands of opportunities for social learning every day, and
several million opportunities for social learning within their
first 2–3 years of life. This is the magnitude of the accrual of
atypical experiences over time resulting from recurrent
moment-by-moment deviations. These divergences no only
sculpt a child’s experiences over time; they also sculpt abnormal
brain structures and connections as evolving physical instantia-
tions of atypical development.
On “dyadic social neuroscience”
The study of social development over the past several decades has
revealed that the relevant unit of scientific focus is the infant–
caregiver dyad, and the iterative context associated with mutually
reinforcing and adapted social and communicative inter-action
(Klin, 1989; Shonkoff & Bales, 2011; Shultz et al., 2018). Innate
predispositions to orient to social stimuli serve as strong engaging
signals to caregivers, who at once constrain the world around the
child and strengthen the infant–caregiver context (by their recip-
rocal engagement); upon this foundation, ever increasing and
more complex cycles of contingency evolve, from birth over the
course of the first two years of life. The emphasis on the dyad,
rather than on child or caregiver separately, provides the most
important context in which to consider Gene × Environment
interactions, as the caregiver is the most present, stable, and con-
tingently active aspect of the baby’s environment. While an
infant’s social visual engagement with the surrounding environ-
ment is under strict genetic control, the product of this explora-
tion is not chained to this genetic determinism because the
caregiver, though exquisitely attuned to the baby, is nevertheless
free to influence and guide the interaction, to create a baby’s expe-
rience as one of the “dancers” in this mutually reinforcing chore-
ography. The most important lesson here is that the baby’s
biology of adaptation cannot be viewed separately from its envi-
ronment, particularly from its social environment (i.e., the care-
giver), which is, as noted, subject to stochastic (or chance)
events, intrinsic predispositions (e.g., caregiving style), and/or
external manipulations (e.g., in the case of caregiver coaching).
On heterogeneity and homogeneity
As noted, ASD is one of the most highly heritable of all complex
neuropsychiatric conditions (Constantino et al., 2013) but no sin-
gle molecular marker defines its diagnosis. Instead, current esti-
mates suggest that hundreds of genetic and genomic disorders
(Betancur, 2011) —the majority of which are still unknown—
may play a role in etiology, including rare and common variants
(Geschwind & State, 2015; Sanders et al., 2015). No single gene
has yet been associated with more than a fraction of patient
cases, in fact less than 1% (Chaste et al., 2015), and the extent
to which any pattern of gene variants or expression can reliably
indicate risk of the condition remains unclear. There are numer-
ous hoped-for future insights into the developmental neurobiol-
ogy of ASD (State & Sestan, 2012), but the condition is still
diagnosed behaviorally by the presence of its defining character-
istics, via direct behavioral examination and historical informa-
tion (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz, & Klin, 2004). There is,
however, vast phenotypic heterogeneity, spanning the entire
range of IQ and language function, with variable profiles of
strengths and deficits, symptom characteristics, change over
time, and comorbidities with common psychiatric conditions
such as anxiety, mood, and attentional disorders (Tordjman
et al., 2017). Adding additional layers of complexity to both geno-
typic and phenotypic heterogeneity is the notion that there are
additional phenotypic routes to ASD, including serious pre- and
neonatal medical conditions known to be associated with delete-
rious effects on early brain development, such as extreme prema-
turity (Joseph et al., 2017a) and congenital heart disease
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(Razzaghi, Oster, & Reefhuis, 2015), both of which represent a
manifold higher risk increase for ASD.
Given the multiplicity of possible causes, and the phenotypic
expression of so many “autisms” (Insel, 2010), a timely question
might be “from where does the homogeneity of ASD arise?” In
an effort to understand the link between vast genotypic and phe-
notypic heterogeneity on the one hand and common manifesta-
tions of core disability on the other, one important factor is
development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; Oyama, 2000). One possi-
bility is that ongoing maladaptive action that fails to follow the
course of normative social growth may be an important factor
that forces diverse genetic vulnerabilities into common syndromic
presentation. Or, in other words, the homogeneity of ASD may
come not from some common final pathway among hundreds
of initial causes but from commonalities on what these causes dis-
rupt, namely infant–caregiver reciprocal social interaction (Jones
& Klin, 2009). As noted, early brain development happens in
the context of a baby’s use of mechanisms of adaptive action,
mechanisms that are present at birth or shortly thereafter. One
such mechanism is engagement with caregivers. Given the fragil-
ity of human infants at birth, success on this task is of immediate
survival value and of fundamental evolutionary significance. It
should come as little surprise, therefore, that typically developing
infants show a number of highly conserved skills that facilitate
engagement with others. In contrast, infants and toddlers with
ASD display early disruptions in these foundational skills,
which represent early departures from normative processes.
Following from the experience-expectant model of child develop-
ment (Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987; Johnson &
Karmiloff-Smith, 2004), in which the genetically determined
schedule of neural maturation matches the timing of adaptive
tasks, disruptions of socialization processes occurring at different
times are likely to result in different outcomes. Thus, although the
homogeneity of autism may originate from shared failings in the
process of socialization as a whole, the heterogeneity may stem
from variable timing in the onset of individual disruptions. In
typical development, success in social adaptive tasks prompts fur-
ther development in an iterative process that builds on older
structures to generate new ones. This process is ever ongoing,
resulting in successively more complex social cognitive develop-
ment. In this fashion, ontogeny typically realizes phylogenetic
predispositions through the rapid movement of the child through
universal social adaptive tasks, jerry-building successful social and
communicative babies (Bates, Benigni, Camaioni, Bretherton, &
Volterra, 1979). However, if this process is derailed, we expect
that the earlier the disruption, the greater will be the develop-
mental consequences. This model also predicts that blockage
of the normative social adaptive trajectories will bias the child
to forms of learning that are not grounded in social interaction:
for example, preponderance of learning about the physical envi-
ronment (e.g., physical over social contingencies), rote speech
over contextualized communication, hyperlexia over conceptual
reading, and memorization of facts and information over epi-
sodic and personal information—all of which are features well
noted in the later-life clinical expression of ASD (Klin et al.,
2003).
This account of heterogeneity in typical and atypical individual
differences was probably put forward most succinctly by Charles
Nelson: “… because so many aspects of development are activity-
dependent, we should not be surprised to observe a broad range
of individual differences; after all, given differences in prenatal
histories, in genomes, in rearing environments, in caretaking,
and in inculturation, to name just a few, each brain is left to incor-
porate experience differently. This, in turn, will result in differ-
ences in how infants embrace their environments, which in
turn will lead to further differences in neural substrate … ad
infinitum” (Nelson, 1999, p. 425).
Summarizing Features of an Early Brain Development
Re-definition of ASD
The previous discussion would necessitate a distinction between
the genetic risk that children are born with from the disorder
that emerges in the second and third year of life. To make this dis-
tinction clear, we use here the term “autism” to signify the genetic
risk, and the term “ASD” to signify the disability that may result
from the genetic risk a child is born with. As such, one might ten-
tatively define ASD according to the following criteria.
• ASD is a common neurodevelopmental disability emerging in
the second year of life, typically but not exclusively of complex
genetic origins, that results from early disruptions of founda-
tional mechanisms of socialization.
• ASD is marked by heterogeneous expressions of social, commu-
nication, sensory, and behavioral disabilities and rigidities,
which may be associated with significant intellectual and lan-
guage impairment.
• “Autism” is a common inborn risk, highly heritable and genet-
ically complex, representing the extreme expression of a nor-
mally distributed trait or constellation of traits in the areas of
social and communicative function.
• Autism places a child at risk for ASD via the effects of early, fre-
quent and cumulative disruptions of reciprocal social interac-
tion, caused by the child’s attenuated engagement with others
and inability to adaptively adjust to the demands of the sur-
rounding social environment.
• In the first year of life, evidence that autism is leading to ASD
comes from measurements of deviation from social and com-
municative milestones, which are reduced, particularly in
regards to social visual and social vocal contingent interactions
with others.
• In the second year of life, evidence that autism is leading to
ASD comes from observations of ASD symptoms, which
become more pronounced toward the second half of the second
year of life.
• Because autism as a profile or constellation of traits is instanti-
ated in dynamic social environment, its expression is influenced
by the caregiving behavior of others as well as by other environ-
mental factors and chance events, particularly insofar as they
impact the social context of child–caregiver relationship and
experiences.
Implications of an Early Brain Development Re-definition of
ASD for the Early Detection and Intervention Enterprise
By building a re-definition of ASD for vulnerable infants and tod-
dlers on the basis of principles and science of typical early brain
development and disruptions thereof seen in the early pathogen-
esis of ASD, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions that
have direct impact on challenges and opportunities associated
with research and policy of early detection and treatment in ASD.
• Waiting to begin treatment for their social communication and
behavior vulnerabilities until a diagnosis of ASD is attained
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means missing the period of a child’s greatest neuroplasticity,
the most favorable window of opportunity to optimize out-
comes and attenuate symptoms.
• More accurate and quantitative early detection of risk for ASD,
including prodromal and very early expressions of the condi-
tion, are becoming possible through measurements of
early-emerging social and communicative behavior, and, specif-
ically, deviations from normative skills (not unlike a child’s fall-
ing percentile on a growth chart for physical height or weight).
• The more we wait to intervene in order to course-correct an
atypical developmental path, like in ASD, the more entrenched
it becomes, and the more difficult it is to change it.
• Given the cascading nature of child development (the canaliza-
tion principle), minor deviations from normative development
early on can accrue with time and become not only major devi-
ations but actual aberrant behaviors, or symptoms, which then
beget more symptoms via associative learning (e.g., Moriuchi,
Klin, & Jones, 2017).
• The converse is also true: were we to be able to normalize early
learning experiences to some extent, this could have an outsize
effect downstream in development because this would not only
alleviate severity of symptoms but would also create its own cas-
cade toward more typical experiences and the acquisition of
normative skills resulting from these experiences.
• A child’s development is the product of mutually reinforcing
adaptive action between child and caregiver. Whereas a child’s
attenuated draw to others, like in the case of ASD, will impact
the product of social interaction thus limiting the learning expe-
rience, a caregiver’s deliberate compensation may potentially
attenuate the disruption and normalize somewhat the social–
communicative interaction, and, in this way, promote the
child’s learning. For example, parent coaching has been
shown to significantly increase conversation turns and advance
infant language development (Ferjan Ramírez, Lytle, & Kuhl,
2020).
• Most evidence-based early treatment modalities in ASD are
caregiver-mediated. We might not be able to engineer a child
“better genes,” but we might be able to engineer the kind of
environment surrounding the child that would promote, prob-
abilistically, less deviant behavior and more normative behavior.
The most important component of the surrounding environ-
ment is, of course, the child’s caregiver, and the engineering
of caregiver behavior is indeed the main principle underlying
current evidence-based early treatments for ASD (Dawson
et al., 2010; Ingersoll & Wainer, 2013).
• Engaging caregivers as allies in the treatment of children does
not mean an intervention meant to “correct bad parenting”
or to somehow correct something that parents are not doing
right. The causative disruption of the child–caregiver unit of
development is the instantiation of the child’s genetic risk.
For most children, the redundancies and robustness of social–
communicative predispositions and contingencies of the
child–caregiver relationship, “good enough” caregiving is suffi-
cient to move social–communicative development forward. But
in the case of vulnerable infants and toddlers, there is a need to
train and support caregivers, to deliberately engineer social inter-
active engagement using behavioral principles (Schreibman et al.,
2015), so that caregivers can leverage every moment of daily expe-
riences to promote social–communicative development
(Wetherby et al., 2014), thus alleviating the deleterious implica-
tions of thousands of missed opportunities for social learning
experienced by infants and toddlers with ASD every day.
• In contrast to ethical concerns debated in the past (Yudell,
Tabor, Dawson, Rossi, & Newschaffer, 2013), parents of babies
at high risk for ASD are reassured and feel supported by, and
thankful for, prospective monitoring and expert guidance.
There is some evidence to suggest that this form of cost-
effective and community-viable practice is in itself beneficial
for children’s outcomes (Micheletti et al., 2020), and
parent-coaching practices may have benefits for a much broader
range of vulnerable children including those growing up in low-
income environments (Ferjan Ramírez et al., 2020) (see below),
thus allaying fears of the cost of “false positives” in universal
screening, which tend to be children with non-ASD develop-
mental concerns that are actionable and likely to benefit from
early intervention (e.g., Robins et al., 2014).
• Given the multiplicity of causes of ASD, the homogeneity of
phenotypic expression (the fact that despite vast behavioral het-
erogeneity there is great validity in the nosologic category),
comes from what the various causes disrupt (rather than com-
monalities across the causes), namely reciprocal social interac-
tion between child and caregiver, which is the universal
platform for early social and communicative brain develop-
ment. In this light, ASD as a clinical construct stands for social
communication very much like intellectual disabilities as a clin-
ical construct stands for cognition. It is no surprise that ASD is
almost as common as intellectual disabilities. And it should fol-
low that, like intellectual disabilities, where the cognitive trait is
measured in terms of deviation from norms, in ASD the social
communication trait should be measured in terms of deviation
from norms.
• That ASD may represent the result of disruptions of reciprocal
interaction (which acts like a final common pathway among
myriad etiologies) is supported by the multifold increase in
risk for ASD in children born with medical conditions known
to impact early brain development, specifically white matter
injuries, such as extreme prematurity (Hinojosa-Rodríguez
et al., 2017) and congenital heart disease (Licht et al., 2009;
Wernovsky & Licht, 2016). Interestingly, brain development
abnormalities in both conditions have been deemed to be sim-
ilar, but the question is whether an ASD phenotype in these two
populations is associated with brain injuries of specific signifi-
cance to early social development (Shultz et al., 2018). The
entrenched view that ASD can only be of a syndromic or
“sporadic” genetic form, and it cannot result from some other
etiology capable of disrupting social behavior and brain, is
often apparent when scientists at times comment that say the
8% (Joseph et al., 2017b) or so of infants born extremely pre-
term who end up with an ASD diagnosis have a “different
kind” of ASD, and that neurodevelopmental research of these
infants cannot help elucidate ASD pathogenesis. And yet, the
“ASD” found in these populations does not appear to be, phe-
nomenologically and clinically, different from the more tradi-
tional genetic kind, as indicated in practice parameters for
these conditions (e.g., Marino et al., 2012).
• As noted, other cohorts of vulnerable children may present with
opportunities for treatments intended to support early social
and communication development, including those with other
neurogenetic etiologies such as children with Fragile X and
Williams syndrome, or children born in adverse conditions
such as poverty: in all of these cases, there is a higher than
expected prevalence of autism-related social and communica-
tion disabilities (Boat & Wu, 2015; Crespi & Procyshyn, 2017;
McCary & Roberts, 2013).
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• Because the unit for research of behavior–brain social and com-
municative development is the child–caregiver relationship,
experience, and environment, there should be rigorous quanti-
fication of environmental features influencing this unit
(Berman et al., 2019), particularly sociodemographic variables
(Bornstein et al., 2013) and adverse childhood experiences
(Beauchaine & Cicchetti, 2019; Beauchaine et al., 2018;
Shonkoff & Bales, 2011)
Caveats
To energize a research enterprise aimed at probing the possibili-
ties for optimized outcomes afforded by a developmental psycho-
pathology view of ASD does not mean that the state of the science
is such that we already know that treatments and interventions
building from this view are going to be successful, nor that we
know exactly what are the most effective active ingredients. In
fact, there are cautionary tales suggesting otherwise (e.g.,
Whitehouse, Varcin, Alvares, Barbaro, & Hudry, 2019), which
point to the need for early treatment research that will probe, in
larger samples and with much greater specificity and definition
of active ingredients, the efficacy of caregiver-mediated treatments
(Kasari, 2019). Given the promise of gains with lifetime implica-
tions, it is disappointing that this literature has been slow to grow.
And yet, progress has been made, and evidence for the beneficial
effects of caregiver-mediated treatments is accruing in regards to
children with ASD and developmental delays (e.g., Kaiser & Roberts,
2013; Roberts & Kaiser, 2015; Stern, Maltman, & Roberts, 2017) and
with other inborn vulnerabilities (Roberts, 2019).
It is nevertheless important to emphasize that caregiver-
mediated treatments are not simply a convenient treatment
modality, chosen because of its being less expensive and more
community-viable than expert-delivered treatments, and more
readily funded via IDEA Part C. The case for caregiver-mediated
treatment, as noted, builds on some 20 years of research on the
criticality of infant–caregiver dyadic contingency as an
evolutionarily-conserved, early-emerging, platform for social
communication development from birth on (Feldman, 2007,
2017). These synchronies are quantified from the first weeks
and months of life (e.g., Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crown, &
Jasnow, 2001) and remain operational throughout one’s life via
subliminal, synchronized behavioral communicative signals (e.g.,
Hömke, Holler, & Levinson, 2018), and at the neural level
(Kinreich, Djalovski, Kraus, Louzoun, & Feldman, 2017).
Having said that, one important lesson from attempts to engi-
neer the environment of vulnerable children in order to effect
beneficial change is that our knowledge of environmental factors,
and particularly, our ability to quantify their effects, are still lim-
ited. This is evident not only in ASD research and, in fact, more
illustrative cautionary tales originate from other fields. For exam-
ple, a recent large study showed that concordance rate of schizo-
phrenia in identical twins is a surprisingly low 33%, suggesting
untapped opportunities to prevent this serious mental health con-
dition using knowledge of nonshared environment, or chance,
influences (Hilker et al., 2018). In other words, after decades of
research of schizophrenia, our knowledge of pre-emptive inter-
ventions is still limited. This situation is even more striking in
ASD research. In a recent study focused on monozygotic twin
concordance and discordance for autistic trait severity, while pro-
bandwise concordance for ASD was an extremely high .96, the
concordance rate for variation-in-severity of symptomatology
had an R2 on the order of .1, indicating that profile and level of
disability in identical twins with ASD is substantially influenced
by nonshared environmental factors; this is an intriguing finding
raising the possibility for novel targets of early ASD amelioration
but as yet unknown (Castelbaum, Sylvester, Zhang, Yu, &
Constantino, 2019).
Despite these disappointments, advances are being made, and
this is particularly evident in the emerging field of “Environmental
Neuroscience” (Berman et al., 2019), which builds from develop-
mental systems theory (Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001) to chart
and quantify the unfolding interactions occurring across brain–
behavior and physical–social environments. The focus here is on
“emerging phenomena” (Anderson, 2015), which is what ASD has
been hypothesized to be (Shultz et al., 2018), within this multiscale
science promoting the study of cycles of contingency occurring
within and across this gene–brain–behavior–environment frame-
work of analysis (Nelson, 1999).
Concluding Thoughts
To re-define ASD in early brain development terms is to revisit
the world of opportunities afforded by current science to optimize
children’s outcomes despite the liabilities that they are born with.
It is to counter outdated notions that devastating disability is deter-
mined the moment a child is born, and that these burdens are inev-
itable, with only improvements being some alleviation of symptoms
and increased independent-living skills. The impetus for writing
this opinion piece is the concern that such views of neurodevelop-
mental conditions such as ASD can become self-fulfilling science
and policy in ways that are diametrically opposed to what we cur-
rently know, and are learning more every day, of how genetic liabil-
ities become, or not, instantiated as lifetime disabilities.
This approach is difficult to contemplate when one’s experi-
ence of ASD is of a child, adolescent, or adult whose clinical pre-
sentation is marked by self-injury, aggression, thrashing behavior,
and life-threatening elopement. But this approach is now difficult
to avoid if one accompanies babies’ first year of life on a path to
ASD. These two contexts generate two levels of scientific and pol-
icy discourse. Unless they are reconciled by the emerging science
of gene–brain–behavior interdependencies in the neuroscience of
early brain development, there is concern that the world of oppor-
tunities made possible by early detection and early treatment will
remain under-powered.
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